Esse artigo analisa a apropriação e a influência do conceito Māyā na filosofia de Schopenhauer durante o período de gênese de sua filosofia. Diferente das análises meramente comparativas, nosso foco é apresentar uma pesquisa histórico-filosófica a partir dos Manuscritos Juvenis e d’O Mundo como Vontade e como Representação, assim como, delimitar a “Índia schopenhaueriana” a partir das obras consultadas pelo filósofo durante o referido período: Oupnek’hat, Asiatisches Magazin, Mythologie des Indous e Asiatick Researches. Nosso objetivo é demonstrar, cronologicamente, como Schopenhauer (...) se apropriou do conceito Māyā, utilizando-o com sentidos e formas diferentes até consolidar o seu uso com a ideia de ilusão e influenciar sua teoria da Representação. (shrink)

This article aims to examine Adam Smith’s deep and broad influence on the thought of Amartya Sen, especially concerning the issue of social justice that pervades the writings of both authors. First, we will analyze Sen’s revision of the work of Smith to refute the interpretation still prevalent, that makes use of certain excerpts from The Wealth of Nations as the main reference in defending the deregulation of markets and in exempting the economic thought from any consideration of moral values, (...) demonstrating how Sen draws on Smith’s ideas to explain the impoverishment of economics when it departs from ethics. Then, we will consider the overwhelming influence of the Smithian thought on Sen’s criticism of the theory of rational choice through his distinctive formulation of the theory of social choice, whose importance was rightly recognized, earning him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998. (shrink)

Analisa a representação de informações referentes à identidade e a religião islâmica no esquema de classificação bibli-ográfica mais utilizado do mundo. Investiga a existência de desvios na representação de assuntos referentes a culturas não alinhadas à cultura ocidental na 23ª edição da Classificação Decimal de Dewey (CDD23). Conceitua Organização do Conhecimento em sentido restrito como organização das informações em registros bibliográficos e, em sentido amplo, como a organização social do trabalho mental. Define Sistemas de Organização do Conhecimento, enquanto sistemas conceituais (...) atuantes como tipos de representação do conhecimento sendo frutos da organização do conhe-cimento. Aborda a construção do conceito de Islamismo no Ocidente considerando as transformações de sentido mo-duladas pelo contexto sociocultural, conferindo ao Islã a imagem da violência. Define Religião segundo Durkheim como sistema unificado de crenças e de práticas relativo a coisas sagradas; e segundo Hans Mol como a identidade sacralizada. Aponta que a parcialidade na organização do conhecimento permite que documentos relativos à cultura e à identidade de grupos sociais não alinhados jamais sejam recuperados. Objetiva identificar como os assuntos referen-tes a culturas não alinhadas com o ocidente estão organizados; verificar a influência do contexto sociocultural na representação e recuperação da informação em bases de dados de culturas diversas; analisar o Islamismo e suas rela-ções conceituais na CDD. Para alcançar os objetivos propostos realizamos estudosna CDD23 segundo a metodologia de Miranda (2009), pesquisa bibliografica em bases de dados de diferentes culturas com ênfase nas influências do contexto sociocultural na produção cientifica pertinente a cultura Islâmica. Os resultados do estudo da representação do Islamismo na CDD23 demonstaram a existência de desvios (biases) de representação históricas da CDD, evidenci-ados tanto na seleção terminológica quanto em sua estrutura conceitual. Os resultados do levantamento bibliográfico nas bases de dados demonstram uma produção cientifica sobre assuntos referentes a cultura e identidade muçulmana numerosa e diversificada nas bases de dados de natureza global (DOAJ) e não ocidental (AJOL) e uma baixa produção na base de dados ocidental (Scielo). Reitera a necessidade da conduta ética por parte do profissional na classificação de assuntos não alinhadas a cultura ocidental. (shrink)

Physiological responses in futsal have not been studied together with temporal information about the players’ stay on the court. The aim of this study was to compare heart rate and blood lactate concentration responses between 1-H and 2-H considering the time of permanency of the players on the court at each substitution in a futsal match. HR was recorded during entire match and [La−] was analyzed after each substitution of seven players. %HRmean and [La−] mean did not differ between 1-H (...) and 2-H. Time in intensity zones of 50–100 %HRmax differed only in 60–70 %HRmax. HR coefficient of variation throughout the match was low and among the four outfield players on the court. Substitutions, time of permanence on the court, ratio between time in- and out-ratio on the court also were similar between 1-H and 2-H. Balancing the number of substitutions, and the In:Outcourt ratio of players in both halves of the match, playing lower time at 1-H, ~8 min for each participation in the match, made it possible to maintain intensity of the match in 2-H similar to the 1H. These results are a good guidance to coaches and for application in future studies. (shrink)

Em Além do Princípio do Prazer, Freud propõe uma especulação sobre a pulsão de morte, mas percebe desde logo a dificuldade de isolá-la da pulsão de vida. A pulsão de morte possui autonomia em relação à pulsão de vida no quadro da teoria pulsional freudiana? Para responder essa questão, delimitando-a à psicanálise freudiana, propõe-se uma abordagem em quatro etapas. Em um primeiro ponto, faz-se um exercício hermenêutico baseado no texto Além do Princípio do Prazer. Logo depois, em um segundo ponto, (...) amplia-se o exercício a outros textos de Freud que abordam e exemplificam a pulsão de morte. Em um terceiro ponto, coloca-se em foco a evolução que levou Freud a afirmar a autonomia da pulsão de morte. Como Freud não oferece, mesmo em seus últimos textos, um exemplo claro da pulsão de morte isolada, apresentamos duas respostas possíveis, com base nas interpretações de Luiz Garcia-Roza e de Ignácio Paim Filho. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to present Gödel's discussion on concepts, from 1944 to the late 1970s, in particular relation to the thought of Frege and Russell. The discussion takes its point of departure from Gödel's claim in notes on Bernay's review of ?Russell's mathematical logic?. It then retraces the historical background of the notion of intension which both Russell and Gödel use, and offers some grounds for claiming that Gödel consistently considered logic as a free-type theory of concepts, called (...) intensions, considered as the denotations of predicate names. (shrink)

Internationally recognized logicians present current thinking on the understanding of the role of deduction in human reasoning.

Difficulties and ambiguities of Carnap’s conception of logic and mathematics are the main target of Gödel’s analysis in his famous drafts of “Is mathematics Syntax of Language?”. In a recent article, Gregory Lavers discusses two main recent dismissive analyses of Gödel’s drafts, concluding at a defense of Gödel’s arguments against Carnap’s position in the 1930. Lavers partially integrates in his examination an argument that I presented in a paper published in 2003. Yet, there are three important differences between my understanding (...) of Gödel’s argument and Lavers’s interpretation of it. These differences concern the appreciation of (a) Gödel’s strategy of using, in any critical examination of his opponents, only arguments that can be accepted by them; (b) Gödel’s analysis of Carnap’s position in the 1950s; (c) Gödel’s understanding of Carnap’s philosophical project. The paper aims to argue that, contrary to Lavers’s opinion, Gödel takes seriously the details of Carnap’s original conception and does not overlook the novelty of its solutions in the 1930s and 1950s. In particular, the comparison between Gödel’s arguments in the Gibbs lecture of 1951 and in version III of his draft of ‘Is mathematics Syntax of Language?’ shows how Gödel had in 1953–55 a careful concern with Carnap’s philosophical project of LSL. (shrink)

v. 1. Montaigne, Schlegel -- v. 2. Kafka.

O objetivo deste trabalho é a analisar a utilização e impacto das fake news nos últimos anos da vida política brasileira enquanto propulsão ao esvaziamento do pensamento e uma zona de anomia entre democracia e totalitarismo que captura e sacraliza a vida biológica humana ao mesmo tempo que a abandona, reconhecida como estado de exceção permanente. Para tanto, abordamos as obras de Hannah Arendt e Giorgio Agamben, bem como analisamos fenomenologicamente algumas das fake news mais divulgadas entre a população brasileira (...) no período das eleições presidenciais de 2018. Por fim, entendemos que a verdade factual, resguardada pelas humanidades e transmitida pela mídia é capaz de levar a população novamente à percepção da realidade e ao resgate do sentido da política pela ação. (shrink)

After a brief discussion of Kreisel’s notion of informal rigour and Myhill’s notion of absolute proof, Gödel’s analysis of the subject is presented. It is shown how Gödel avoids the notion of informal proof because such a use would contradict one of the senses of “formal” that Gödel wants to preserve. This Gödelian notion of “formal” is directly tied to his notion of absolute proof and to the question of the general applicability of concepts, in a way that overcomes both (...) Kreisel and Myhill’s conceptions. This paper aims to contribute to the present-day debate on informal and epistemic mathematics, focusing on what appears necessary for a better understanding of the issues at stake. (shrink)

In response to the many social impacts of automated mobility, in September 2020 the European Commission published Ethics of Connected and Automated Vehicles, a report in which recommendations on road safety, privacy, fairness, explainability, and responsibility are drawn from a set of eight overarching principles. This paper presents the results of an interdisciplinary research where philosophers and engineers joined efforts to operationalize the guidelines advanced in the report. To this aim, we endorse a function-based working approach to support the implementation (...) of values and recommendations into the design of automated vehicle technologies. Based on this, we develop methodological tools to tackle issues related to personal autonomy, explainability, and privacy as domains that most urgently require fine-grained guidance due to the associated ethical risks. Even though each tool still requires further inquiry, we believe that our work might already prove the productivity of the function-based approach and foster its adoption in the CAV scientific community. (shrink)

Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give (...) an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails. (shrink)

This chapter tries to answer the following question: How should we conceive of the method of mathematics, if we take a naturalist stance? The problem arises since mathematical knowledge is regarded as the paradigm of certain knowledge, because mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. Moreover, natural science is deeply mathematized, and science is crucial for any naturalist perspective. But mathematics seems to provide a counterexample both to methodological and ontological naturalism. To face this problem, some authors tried to naturalize (...) mathematics by relying on evolutionism. But several difficulties arise when we try to do this. This chapter suggests that, in order to naturalize mathematics, it is better to take the method of mathematics to be the analytic method, rather than the axiomatic method, and thus conceive of mathematical knowledge as plausible knowledge. (shrink)

There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some authors (...) think that the epistemic account is to be preferred if one takes a realist stance. Recently, Dellsén proposed the noetic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when scientists achieve increased understanding of a phenomenon. Dellsén claims that the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of scientific progress than the epistemic account. This paper aims precisely at assessing whether the noetic account is a more adequate realist account of progress than the epistemic account. (shrink)

What things mean to us involves more than what they afford in a straightforward sense (e.g., motor affordances). One can think of bodily adornments, lines, or precious stones. Differently from tools like hammers, these things are used to be displayed, watched etc. The paper investigates this very important feature of human behaviour, focusing especially on the expressive possibilities, or salience, of tools. This is interpreted as an emergent property of our engagement with tools, for which tools matter to us because (...) of what they show, not just because of what we do with them in a strict sense. A phenomenological approach is obtained by building upon Heidegger's view of tools as structured by implicit “indications” of relevance; this approach is developed by engaging with debates on mark making, stone tools, and aesthetic experience. It is argued that the salience of things is a process where indications of relevance become explicit and relatively distanced from motor affordances; this alliance of explicitness and absence of action allows for things to "resonate" in us, inviting us to see tools as invitations to imagine, think, and remember. The paper considers examples of entanglements of salience and affordances, where tools and techniques shape symbols and imaginaries. (shrink)

We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid.

Pixelism is the combination of three metaphysical thesis, namely a radical form of exdurantism, mereological nihilism and counterpart theory. Pixelism is a theory that evaluates all the metaphysical phenomena of persistence, composition and modality in a homogeneous and consistent manner. In a pixel world, there is no identity over time and over possible worlds and nothing persists over more than an instant or a world. Entities can be univocally identified by a five-coordinates system (the three spatial dimensions, the temporal one (...) and the possible worlds), and their relation is a counterpart relation both in different worlds and at different times or different regions of space. In this paper I will provide two models for pixelism: the first one takes pixels to be hypercubes, i. e. four-dimensional cubes, the acceptance of which is conditional on the acceptance of extended simples. The second one considers pixels as points in a four-dimensional space. (shrink)

Filozofia pamięci jest gorącym tematem w kognitywistyce i filozofii umysłu. Niniejsza praca analizuje spór między symulacjami a przyczynową teorią pamięci poprzez badanie poczucia swojskości i jego związku ze śladami pamięciowymi, a dokładniej w jaki sposób zwiększają one płynność rekonstrukcji przeszłych epizodów. Zrozumienie relacji między śladami swojskości i pamięci, a ponadto relacji między pełnoprawną fenomenologią pamięci a poczuciem subiektywnej pewności epizodu, jaki miał miejsce w przeszłości, prowadzi do odmiennej interpretacji rywalizacji między tym, co przyczynowe, a tym, co symulacyjne.

Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop normative standards that allow us to distinguish between more and less legitimate forms of populism. The point of this exercise is not to dismiss populism in toto; the article strives for a more subtle result, namely, to show that liberal democracy can accommodate populism provided that the latter conforms to (...) particular discursive norms. What the article calls a ‘liberal ethics of populism’ turns out to be closely bound up with a broader ethics of peoplehood, understood as a way of articulating who ‘the people’ are in a way that is compatible with liberal–democratic principles of political justification. Such an ethics, concludes the article, inevitably has a much wider audience than populist political actors: its addressees are all those who seek legitimately to exercise power in the name of the people. (shrink)

Derek Parfit played a crucial role in the XX century philosophical debate. His masterpiece, Reasons and Persons, has been highly influential both in moral philosophy, and personal identity. It is hard to overlook the fact that Parfit’s ideas gave the main contribution to the contemporary philosophy of persons. He reformulates a debate stuck in the classical contraposition between psychological and physical criteria of personal identity, by introducing his most famous idea: identity doesn’t matter in survival. This thesis, and its moral (...) implications, has been a challenge for everyone tackling the issues related to persons and normative moral philosophy. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Pruss proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can (...) be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated. (shrink)

The educational reform movement in social studies has focused on constructivist and inquiry-oriented approaches to the teaching of history. Since many social studies teacher education students have had little experience with such approaches in their own schooling, special attention needs to be given to these topics within teacher preparation programs if they are to be implemented in schools. One pathway for accomplishing this is through investigations of local history. This article presents an exploratory qualitative research study investigating pre-service teachers' understanding (...) of inquiry and the impact of a set of lessons in a methods class using local history in the service of inquiry-oriented learning. The results suggest that local history can be an effective tool for stimulating interest in and a deeper understanding of inquiry-oriented teaching. (shrink)

In this paper the author introduces two questions for discussion in Descartes, namely: 1. How to understand the “liberty of indifference” in the thought of Descartes; 2. How to understand the conception of the indivisibility of the soul (or spirit). The first one is a classical topic, already studied, among others, by Martial Guéroult and Lívio Teixeira. It concerns the moral conception of Descartes and the related question about the existence of a “permanent moral” in the thought of Descartes, compared (...) to his “provisory moral”. The second question has more contemporary ramifications, since it is about the relation between body and spirit, or mind, which is central in the philosophical reflections of the XXIst Century. The paper doesn’t try to solve these questions, of course, but intends to point some lines of research taking these issues as starting points. This paper also constitutes a tribute to Professor Franklin Leopoldo e Silva (USP). (shrink)

Populist movements have become key players in European politics. These movements are readily criticized by journalists or political rivals, yet none of the common objections to populism seems to arrest their success. This article turns to normative political theory to cultivate sensitivity to problems arising from some existing arguments against populism, and to explore possible alternatives. It offers a critical reading of prototypical liberal and conservative arguments against populism, and proposes that the principles of solidarity and procedure provide good grounds (...) for a sustainable critique of populism. (shrink)

Focused on city-scale automation, and using self-driving cars (SDCs) as a case study, this article reflects on the role of AI—and in particular, computer vision systems used for mapping and navigation—as a catalyst for urban transformation. Urban research commonly presents AI and cities as having a one-way cause-and-effect relationship, giving undue weight to AI’s impact on cities and overlooking the role of cities in shaping AI. Working at the intersection of data science and social research, this paper aims to counter (...) this trend by exploring the reverse perspective: how do cities affect the development, and expose the present limits, of SDCs? The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by comparing urban and nonurban environments and thoroughly examining the relationship between computer vision and city-specific sociality and form, it defines machine autonomy/automation as a function of the sociotechnical milieu in which an AI system operates. Second, and related, the paper problematizes the notion of SDCs as autonomous technologies and the role it plays in envisioning contending policy arrangements and technical solutions for achieving full driving automation. Finally, the article offers insight into a materialist and spatialized understanding of AI—namely, not as an abstract quality susceptible to replication within discrete machines, but rather as a distributed property emerging through embodied interactions among a multiplicity of agents (human, non-human, and technological) within/with their environments. (shrink)

Popular sovereignty requires that citizens perceive themselves as being able to act and implement decisions, and that they are de facto causally connected to mechanisms of decision making. I argue that the two most common understandings of the exercise of popular sovereignty—which center on direct decision making by the people as a whole and the indirect exercise of democratic agency by elected representatives, respectively—are inadequate in this respect, and go on to suggest a complementary account that stresses the central role (...) of internally democratic and participatory political parties in actualising popular sovereignty, drawing on the democratic theory of Hans Kelsen. (shrink)

Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop...

The present paper aims at contributing to the ethical debate on the impacts of artificial intelligence (AI) systems on human autonomy. More specifically, it intends to offer a clearer understanding of the design challenges to the effort of aligning driving automation technologies to this ethical value. After introducing the discussion on the ambiguous impacts that AI systems exert on human autonomy, the analysis zooms in on how the problem has been discussed in the literature on connected and automated vehicles (CAVs). (...) On this basis, it is claimed that the issue has been mainly tackled on a fairly general level, and mostly with reference to the controversial issue of crash-optimization algorithms, so that only limited design insights have been drawn. However, integrating ethical analysis and design practices is critical to pursue the implementation of such an important ethical value into CAV technologies. To this aim, it is argued, a more applied approach targeted at examining the impacts on human autonomy of current CAV functions should also be explored. As an example of the intricacy of this task, the case of automated route planning is discussed in some detail. (shrink)

In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt (...) for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to advance a philosophically justifiable account of Artificial Moral Agency (AMA). Concerns about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI) traditionally turn on questions of whether these systems are deserving of moral concern (i.e. if they are moral patients) or whether they can be sources of moral action (i.e. if they are moral agents). On the Organic View of Ethical Status, being a moral patient is a necessary condition for an entity to qualify as (...) a moral agent. This view claims that because artificial agents (AAs) lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern and hence cannot be considered to be moral agents. I raise conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to the sense of sentience employed on this view, and I argue that the Organic View does not succeed in showing that machines cannot be moral patients. Nevertheless, irrespective of this failure, I also argue that the entire project is misdirected in that moral patiency need not be a necessary condition for moral agency. Moreover, I claim that whereas machines may conceivably be moral patients in the future, there is a strong case to be made that they are (or will very soon be) moral agents. Whereas it is often argued that machines cannot be agents simpliciter, let alone moral agents, I claim that this argument is predicated on a conception of agency that makes unwarranted metaphysical assumptions even in the case of human agents. Once I have established the shortcomings of this “standard account”, I move to elaborate on other, more plausible, conceptions of agency, on which some machines clearly qualify as agents. Nevertheless, the argument is still often made that while some machines may be agents, they cannot be moral agents, given their ostensible lack of the requisite phenomenal states. Against this thesis, I argue that the requirement of internal states for moral agency is philosophically unsound, as it runs up against the problem of other minds. In place of such intentional accounts of moral agency, I provide a functionalist alternative, which makes conceptual room for the existence of AMAs. The implications of this thesis are that at some point in the future we may be faced with situations for which no human being is morally responsible, but a machine may be. Moreover, this responsibility holds, I claim, independently of whether the agent in question is “punishable” or not. (shrink)

La philosophic politique contemporaine est traversee par la question (ou le defi) du pluralisme. Parmi les theories les plus influentes, qui prennent ce probleme comme point de depart d'une reflexion normative sur la vie politique, on peut compter Celles de Habermas et de Rawls. La theorie discursive et le liberalisme politique, en effet, expriment d'une fagon similaire la question ä laquelle doit repondre toute theorie politique dans le cadre des societes modernes: comment l'existence d'une societe juste et libre est-elle possible (...) sous les conditions d'un desaccord profond et permanent entre les doctrines comprehensives ou les visions du monde qui la composent? Meme si leurs reponses au defi du pluralisme divergent ä des points importants, Habermas et Rawls partagent aussi l'idee selon laquelle la legitimite d'une conception de la justice politique depend des raisons qui peuvent etre justifiees independamment du contenu normatif propre des doctrines comprehensives ou des visions du monde. Je pense que l'idee rawlsienne de la raison publique, au moins dans sa derniere etape de developpement, permet d'envisager une nouvelle reponse ä la critique habermassienne, dans la mesure oü le consensus par recoupement n'est pas simplement une convergence heureuse qui survient par hasard, mais au contraire ne peut jouer un role approprie dans la justification politique que s'il contribue ä la stabilite sociale pour des raisons correctes. La conception politique de la justice chez Rawls partage l'idee d'une democratic deliberative organisee autour d'un ideal de justification politique dont l'aspect central est le raisonnement public des citoyens. Cette justification politique ne saurait etre interpretee comme une accommodation pure et simple des doctrines comprehensives divergentes. Elle implique l'idee d'une acceptability rationnelle fondee sur le principe liberal de legitimite. Une telle interpretation nous montre que le liberalisme politique est plus proche de la theorie discursive que ces deux penseurs, pour des raisons differentes, seraient susceptibles d'admettre. (shrink)

Foi o filósofo Friedrich Schleiermacher quem primeiro intentou transformar a hermenêutica, técnica interpretativa do XVII dirigida exclusivamente à exegese de textos bíblicos e jurídicos, numa ciência da compreensão dos discursos em geral. Elevada a princípio interpretativo universal, a hermenêutica schleiermacheriana aspirava para os discursos escritos àquilo que a retórica aristotélica e a de Quintiliano (II, XVII, 37-38), entre outras que lhes são posteriores, propuseram para todo hábito discursivo, não somente para os escritos, muitos séculos antes. Mais restrita, contudo, porquanto re" (...) etida no modelo da cienti! cidade, o núcleo dessa nova metodologia, a compreensão, diferentemente da invenção,disposição,ação,memória,elocução retóricas, fechava-se sobre si mesma como movimento impelido pela autoconsciência!metodológica inerente às epistemologias modernas. (shrink)

Après avoir indiqué ce qu’il entend par Mathématiques pures et par Théorie de la connaissance, Vuillemin annonce, dans l’Introduction au premier tome de La Philosophie de l’algèbre, que son but est double. En considérant le « rapport étroit » et l’« affinité d’inspiration » entre ces deux disciplines, il se propose d’examiner, d’une part, « comment une connaissance pure est possible » et, d’autre part, de « critiquer, reformer et définir, autant qu’il se pourra, la méthode propre à la philosophie (...) théorique » grâce aux « analogies » repérées dans la connaissance mathématique. Ce double but dérive du constat, reposant sur l’analyse de l’histoire des mathématiques et de la philosophie, qu’« un renouvellement des méthodes de celles-là a, à chaque fois, des répercussions sur celle-ci ». Les renouvellements des méthodes que les mathématiques modernes induisent portent essentiellement, selon Vuillemin, sur les notions de structure, d’infini et de logique. Le deuxième tome de La Philosophie de l’algèbre devait donc montrer comment définir la méthode propre à la philosophie théorique. On essaiera de montrer comment le dernier chapitre du premier tome de cet ouvrage contient en soi des difficultés qui commanderont l’abandon du projet et comment l’idée de pluralisme qui y est esquissée exige une refonte conceptuelle que Vuillemin ne fournira que plus de vingt ans après. (shrink)

L'application de la notion de structure à l'analyse des systèmes philosophiques est sans doute l'un des développements les plus fructueux de ce qu'on a appelé le structuralisme. La tradition inaugurée par Martial Gueroult et poursuivie par Victor Goldschmidt, Jules Vuillemin et d'autres a conduit à une fondation critique de la notion de système philosophique et a renouvelé profondément la méthode de l'histoire de la philosophie. En cherchant à reconstituer les orientations principales de cette tradition, nous essayons d'abord de distinguer le (...) structuralisme en philosophie du structuralisme en mathématique et en linguistique. Nous prenons comme base de discussion de cette question l'analyse de Gilles-Gaston Granger donnée en 1967, dans Pensée formelle et sciences de l'homme. Ensuite, nous abordons trois problèmes centraux de l'application de la notion de système en philosophie. La question de la clôture des concepts philosophiques ; la question de la vérité ; la question des rapports entre science et philosophie. (shrink)